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Abstract—This paper outlines an ad-hoc architec-
tural design and a practical implementation of a secure,
distributed, fault tolerant and scalable infrastructure
comprised of a distributed network of electronics hard-
ware systems that remotely generate cryptographic
keys, store them, digitally sign cryptographic transac-
tions based on such keys, and record the transactions
on a blockchain. The proposed solution is suitable to
service both crypto-finance and non-finance applica-
tions, and the physical infrastructure is designed to be
implemented using off-the-shelf industrial electronics,
which further sustains the already scalable-by-design
infrastructure architecture.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Crypto Assets, Physical
Security
I. Introduction
Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2007 [1], the number
of applications based on blockchain and crypto-assets
paradigms has increased exponentially. A common require-
ment for these applications is the use of cryptographic
assets, including private keys and derived concepts such as
crypto-currency wallets. These digital assets are extremely
vulnerable to theft, as proved by the number of cases where
bitcoins for millions of dollars are stolen [2]. It is therefore
crucial to secure these assets, while maintaining the ability
to perform operations such as signing or currency trans-
fers. A number of solutions have been proposed for this
purpose. Mann and Loebenberger propose a two-factor
authentication system for the Bitcoin protocol [3]. Wu et
al. introduced a secure joint Bitcoin trading mechanism
relying on partially blind fuzzy signatures [4]. Gentilal et
al. focus instead on a system protection layer, and utilise
the recent ARM extension of processors architectures,
designated TrustZone, which allows for the separation of
trusted and non-trusted environments [5].
In this paper, we propose the design of a novel dis-
tributed infrastructure, targeted at securely performing a
full life-cycle management of the cryptographic assets that
are instrumental to blockchain applications [6]. At present,
such applications include tokenization of assets, notariza-
tion, smart contracts management, and all the operations
involving crypto-currencies including the transfer of funds.
We propose a complete hardware solution to remotely
generate cryptographic keys, store them, digitally sign
cryptographic transactions based on such keys, and record
the transactions on a blockchain. Such infrastructure was
developed to provide a concrete solution to a currently
unmet practical need that is being exhibited by a fast-
growing population of users who own cryptographic assets
(such as secret keys and crypto-currency wallets), i.e. the
need to simultaneously: 1. retain full control, throughout
the whole lifecycle of the keys (generation, storage and
usage), over the cryptographic private keys that provide
unlimited access to the users’ own cryptographic assets;
2. remotely perform cryptographic operations while at the
same time preserving the security of the underlying keys.
The proposed solution includes the system architecture,
the communication protocol and the keys management
scheme. A dedicated approach for the hardware digital
circuits have been developed to ensure that each system’s
core cryptographic engine, which stores the keys within
a controlled physical perimeter, never gets connected to
external networks, not even while the system is in opera-
tion. The cryptographic circuit is designed to be insulated
from external networks at all times, no matter what
the system state becomes. This constitutes a significant
advantage compared to the other few existing automated
solutions [7], [8], [9], [10], as the latter limit their opera-
tions to activating a cryptographic circuit and connecting
it to the network(s) when needed to.
II. Related Works
At present, the only sector where the needs identified
in the previous section have been fulfilled or at least
addressed to some extent, is crypto-finance, in particular,
the crypto-token and crypto-currency payment and invest-
ment applications. These applications deal with crypto-
currencies or crypto-tokens intended as a subclass or
specific type of the more general category termed crypto
assets [11]. Systems designed for crypto-finance normally
manage only a specific subset of cryptographic operations
(typically related to crypto-currency wallets [12]). Solu-
tions in this area are already being commercialised. For978-1-7281-7091-6/20/$31.00 c©2020 IEEE
consumer-oriented applications, hardware wallets [7], [10]
allow end users to perform financial transactions using
crypto-currencies or crypto-tokens and to track currencies
or tokens in their portfolios. They mostly operate in a
stand-alone mode. The typical use case for these solutions
is an individual end user who employs the hardware wallet
connected to a dedicated software application. The func-
tionalities include storing seed and cryptographic keys on
the physical dongle, while the management of the wallet,
i.e. the management of the various financial positions asso-
ciated to the crypto currencies, is carried out by a software
application running on a smartphone or a PC. On the
business to business side, there are few implementations of
hardware security modules (HSM) [13] dedicated to crypto
assets, such as the one produced by Ledger. However, from
the analysis of the publicly-available documentation such
modules do not entrust end-users with a direct and full
control over their cryptographic private keys [14].
There exist also a number of wallet that haven’t yet
achieved implementation. Recently, Chen et al. proposed
a blockchain-based payment collection supervision system
using pervasive Bitcoin digital wallet [15]. An older wallet
implementation is BlueWallet by Bamert et al. [16], a
proof-of-concept Bitcoin hardware token. The BlueWallet
device communicates using Bluetooth Low Energy and
securely sign Bitcoin transactions. The device can also be
used as an electronic wallet in combination with a point of
sale and serves as an alternative to cash and credit cards.
However, none of the presented solution proposes dis-
tributed architectures for the storage and management of
cryptographic assets. In particular, a distributed privacy-
preserving solution in this context, similar in nature to
those proposed for other distributed systems [17], is miss-
ing. In this paper, we address this gap by designing a
distributed architecture. Our approach enables remote
management and storage of crypto-currency wallets and
private keys while ensuring a high level of availability.
To increase the security of the communication and to
provide an additional privacy layer, a mix-style network
with layered encryption [18], [19] is used.
III. System Design
We propose an architecture that achieves physical insu-
lation of core cryptographic components and information
(e.g. keys), targeted at providing security against adver-
saries with remote access to the device. The proposed ar-
chitecture has been implemented in a prototype, described
in Section IV.
The infrastructure we propose combines layered encryp-
tion and hardware security modules and it is composed by
three classes of systems: user devices, platform nodes (also
called relays), and remote nodes. The capabilities of each
class of nodes, as well as the information they possess is
detailed in Table I.
User devices Ui The user devices are designed to be
small portable devices, able to perform simple opera-
tions when connected to a host computer. Their role
is to authenticate the user, and enable communication
with the platform nodes. Each user has a single device.
The device itself stores on protected memory an elliptic
curve public/private key pair (pkUi , skUi) based on Curve
25519 [20]. Through a software to be installed on the
host computer, the user device is able to establish an
encrypted connection using ECC and the key pair, as
well as symmetric cipher Salsa20 [21]. We note here that
attacks on the host computer are outside the scope of this
paper, and are not considered in the analysis.
Platform nodes Pi Platform nodes act as relays inter-
posing the communication between the user devices and
the remote nodes. Their role is to separate remote nodes
from the Internet, and provide access control and – in
commercial implementations – user accounting and billing.
A number of relays are present, depending on the size of
the overall infrastructure. The nodes are also protected
from DDoS attacks through commercially available cloud
solutions. Each node has an elliptic curve public/private
key pair, and is capable of establishing an encrypted
connection using ECDH and a symmetric cipher Salsa20,
similarly to the user devices. Platform nodes also store a
number of time-stamped nonces that have been created
by each remote node for later use in the establishment of
an Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement.
The nonces are signed by the generating node with its
private key.
Remote nodes Di Several remote nodes collectively
store the cryptographic assets (such as private keys) that
are guarded by the infrastructure. In order to provide a
level of isolation, the assets are stored on a dedicated
device that is distinct from the main remote node system,
connected to the Internet – although protected by a
firewall which allows incoming connection from platform
nodes only. The dedicated electronic device has been
conceived to remain offline most of the time, and is
activated only when it is necessary to perform relevant
cryptographic operations as instructed by the user devices.
This separate cryptographic device is designed to generate,
store and use cryptographic keys. As all the relevant
cryptographic operations can be performed internally to
the node, the keys are never exposed to the main node
system, nor to the outside world. In order to generate
strong keys, the device embeds a true random numbers
generator subsystem (TRNG).
Communication between the parties is described in Fig-
ure 1. The first step is taken by the user Ui, who initiates
the communication by performing an Elliptic-Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) key agreement with a selected platform
Pi, which the user can choose freely among the available
nodes. The agreed key is then used for encrypting any
further communication between the two parties using the
Salsa20. Once an encrypted link between Ui and Pi is
established, the user selects a Di he wants to use to
Devices Keys and Information Main Functions HW Details Web Interfaces
Ui skUi Curve 25519 microcontroller
pkUi Signatures display
pkP1..n Verification single button
pkD1..n Salsa20 self-installing SW for
interfacing with PC
Pi skPi Curve 25519 HW module connected to ssh
pkPi Signatures server via USB
pkU1..n Verification
pkD1..n Salsa20
Ordered cache of D1..n nonces Lamport Signatures
with expiration time
Di skDi Curve 25519 TRNG ssh
pkDi Signatures HW cryptography
pkU1..n Verification Shared memory
pkP1..n Key generation Connected Part Not Connected Part
Asset to be protected ECDSA Curve 25519 Curve 25519
Salsa20 Verification Verification
Lamport Signatures Salsa20 Salsa20
TRNG
ECDSA
TABLE I: Functions of each component of the systems.
Ui Pi Di
ECDH Ui Pi Req







Fig. 1: The layered encryption protocol used to establish a
secure tunnel between the user devices U and the remote
nodes D, using platform nodes P as transparent relays.
perform the required operations, and communicates his
choice to the platform node. The platform node Pi selects
a nonce precomputed by Di among those that it stores
cached, and sends it over to Ui. The user is able to
verify the authenticity and integrity of the random nonce
by checking Di’s signature against its public key. The
nonce will allow Ui and Di to perform an asynchronous
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement using Pi as
relay. Once a key has been agreed by Ui and Di, an
encrypted tunnel between them using the Salsa20 is estab-
lished. The communication will however still be relayed by
Pi, as Ui cannot communicate directly with Di. Packets
originating from Ui are therefore encrypted twice, using
layered encryption in a way that is similar to that of onion
routing [22]. The channel between Ui and Di is used to
transmit the cryptographic instructions to be performed
using the crypto-assets stored on the remote node, and
to communicate back to the user the results if necessary.
We note here that Pi and Di are also connected by an
encrypted tunnel established using the same mechanism
as in the case of Ui and Pi: this part of the protocol has
been omitted from Figure 1 for simplicity.
IV. System Implementation
Figure 2a depicts the simplified version of the circuit
implementing the nodes Di. The system is composed
of two microcontroller units (MCU), one dedicated to
the communication (External), and one dedicated to the
cryptographic operations. The architecture is conceived
to insulate the part handling the communication from
the part executing cryptographic operations using the
protected asset.
Figure 2b and Figure 2c show this insulation. On the
left, in Figure 2b, the box indicated the modules which are
active during the communication with the external world.
During regular operation, this part is active and the second
part, the one devoted to computation of cryptographic
operations, is switched off. Relays are used to enforce this
insulation. When the cryptographic module is operating,
as shown in Figure 2c, the part which communicate with
the rest of the world is powered off. The cryptographically
secure module is operating on an internal memory not
directly accessible from other routine.
The two modules are insulated by means of a relay.
Initially, the two relays are in a default condition. The
microcontroller of the module communicating with the
external world is powered by battery, while the microcon-






















































(c) Active during cryptographic operations
Fig. 2: Block diagram of Di components highlighting the part active during communication and during cryptographic
operations.
switched off. When data are ready in the non volatile
RAM (NVRAM), that in our case is implemented using
a Ferromagnetic RAM (FRAM), and there is the need to
carry out cryptographic operations securely, the internal
module is switched on, and the external one is switched off.
The secure module takes the power from a capacitor, to in-
sulate it from the general power supply. The only common
parts is the NVRAM, which is used for exchanging data
to the cryptographic engine. However, the power supply of
the NVRAM is connected to one source when it operates in
one case, and to another source when it operates in another
case. The NVRAM has a simplified serial interface which
is designed to ensure insulation between the external world
and the cryptographic module.
Below, we list the main components of the solution. A
battery is the primary source of power. A microcontroller
(called external MCU) holds the data to be processed
(e.g. the cryptographic operations to be calculated) is
powered through a relay. Then there is a supercapacitor (of
about some dozen Farads) which is connected to another
relay. Another microcontroller (called internal MCU) will
execute the cryptographic operations using an internal
memory which holds the user’s key material. This memory
use the same power line (not showed here) as the internal
microcontroller. There is a high endurance ferromagnetic
memory, NVRAM, and a solid state relay array (SSRA).
A Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) switch
(which is purely passive) takes care of switching all the
relays to one side or to the opposite, as further specified,
through the control signals. NVRAM is connected through
a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) both to the internal
MCU and to the external MCU through SSRA (to one
or to the other alternately). CPLD switch is connected
through a serial Universal Asynchronous Receiver Trans-
mitter (UART) control channel both to the internal MCU
and to external MCU (also switched by SSRA).
Initially the relays are in default condition: external
MCU is powered by the battery; the supercapacitor is
charged and backed-up by the battery; the NVRAM and
CPLD are powered through the battery; the NVRAM is
connected to the external MCU through SSRA; external
MCU can communicate commands to CPLD switch. In
this phase the internal MCU is completely shut down,
because its power supply is unconnected thanks to the first
relay, and its buses are unconnected because of SSRA. Still
in this phase, external MCU loads into the NVRAM the
operations to be performed. When the process finishes,
the CPLD switch is notified to commute both relays and
SSRA. At this point, external MCU is shut down using the
second relay, whilst the supercapapacitor, that is charged,
powers up: internal MCU via the first relay, and CPLD
and the switch and the MVRAM (without discontinuance)
through direct supercap connection. In this second phase,
internal MCU loads from NVRAM the operations to be
performed, it executes them and it updates the NVRAM.
When it finishes, it informs the CPLD switch to commute
both relays, then the SSRA and therefore the internal
MCU is again shut down and isolated, while the external
MCU becomes active. A functioning prototype is visible
in Figure 3.
V. Conclusions and Discussion
This paper outlines a novel distributed architecture and
communication protocol for the management and storage
of cryptographic assets, including secret keys and crypto-
currency wallets. The proposed infrastructure is a dis-
tributed system using a layered encryption communication
protocol. The cryptographic private keys that control the
associated crypto-assets are split among a number of dif-
ferent nodes, physically located far apart from each other,
providing the intrinsic redundancy of distributed systems.
Fig. 3: The functioning prototype. On the right, the
different phases can be seen via LED indicators: I) the
external communication side is active, and the transaction
is received; II) the transaction is stored on NVRAM; III)
The communication side is inactive, and the cryptographic
side is activated, transactions are loaded from NVRAM;
IV) after signing, the transaction is stored on NVRAM.
Further protection of the assets is provided by an isolated
electronic architecture that allows to securely perform a
variety of cryptographic operations remotely. A dedicated
mechanism has been conceived to insulate the hardware
cryptographic unit in remote nodes, and to make it active
only when needed. The conceived architecture constitutes
an extension of the “cold storage” concept. The remote
node devices not only store cryptographic material, but
also generate the private keys internally, therefore never
exposing them to the outside world.
This system is oriented towards physical security rather
than processing speed. Normally, a digital signature trans-
action system is able to develop a very high number of
signatures per second because it communicates directly
with the outside world. The system described here requires
instead a series of additional steps in order to enable
isolation of the cryptographic part, such as the loading
of the supercapacitor; and the presence of switched ferro-
magnetic memories, which need to be read and written
by both the external and internal processor. For this
reason, in a typical usage session that includes charging the
supercapacitor, managing previously signed transactions
and receiving, depositing, signing and subsequent writing
of new transactions, it is possible to sign a few hundred
transactions per minute.
The functional characteristics of the proposed solution
address several limitations of current technologies, and
in particular allow end users to retain direct operational
control over their private keys. Since the control proto-
col used to instruct operations is abstracted from any
specific type of message, the infrastructure can also be
extended to support future applications that require stan-
dard cryptographic functions, including solutions that go
beyond crypto-currencies. We believe that the proposed
approach is cost-effective and practical, and represents
a fundamental step towards a new generation of secure
devices enabling the remote storage and management of
cryptographic assets.
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